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1 Introduction 
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess 
in common; because it is easy for them to know each others mind; 
and each must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his 
failing in his part, is the abandoning the whole project. But it is 
very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons 
shou’d agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to 
concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them 
to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the 
trouble and expence, and wou’d lay the whole burden on others“. 
(Hume 1740, p.538) 
The problem of organization of cooperative effort among a large number 
of people described above by the great philosopher David Hume is a most 
basic one which has re-occurred countless times throughout human his-
tory. Tribes needed to organize their daily activities so that everyone is 
fed in the evening without being able to control the effort of all members 
at all times. During the First World War, soldiers stuck in trench warfare 
who were opposing each other for extended periods found a mutual 
agreement, finally without tacit cooperation, which allowed both sides to 
survive for some time (Ashworth 1980; Axelrod 1984). Though coopera-
tion got initially started verbally, this was quickly suppressed by super-
iors. Without this mean to establish cooperation, each battalion would fire 
at the same spot at the same time each day so that the other side could 
prepare and eventually reciprocate. This system was later broken-up by 
raids, which made it impossible to leave the enemy unharmed. In modern 
day large scale companies the employer must find ways to induce work-
ers to exert their best effort even if the employer does not possess the 
information, what level this is and has no legal way of obtaining such 
information. 
What about cooperation on an aggregate level such as cooperation among 
nations? Whereas such cooperation on an international scale in the past 
was often limited to a few nations with a clear goal, for example the de-
feat of Nazi Germany or lowering trade barriers simultaneously; issues 
that require international cooperation today tend to be inherently more 
complex rendering cooperation often difficult to achieve. In the case of 
the depletion of the Ozone layer cooperation succeeded via the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and later amend-
ments.  
The problem that arguably currently looms darkest on humanity’s horizon 
is the issue of global climate change. Scientific consensus today points 
towards human activity as one of the main drivers of this change (Stern 
2007; IPCC 2007a). To be clear, the science is still riddled with uncer-
tainties. But though it is sound, science does not always translate well 
into action. In his book ‘Predictably Irrational – the hidden forces that 
shape our decisions’ Dan Ariely (2008) describes a series of experiments 
where people, when giving the opportunity tend to cheat, at least a little. 
More importantly, they tend to cheat a lot when money is not involved 
directly. Even if the tokens that they receive for the outcome of an 
experiment where exchanged seconds later into money, the rate of 
cheating increased dramatically compared to receiving money directly. 
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Concerning the issue of international climate change negotiations this in-
sight from psychology is a saddening one. States are sovereign and can-
not be forced by others to adhere to an agreement or to pay fees for non-
compliance, offering room to ‘cheat’. A cap-and-trade system of green-
house gas emissions is seen by many as the vital component of any such 
international agreement. But such a system, by removing money as a 
direct medium of exchange, may then drastically increase the chances of 
states cheating one another, or not engaging in any sort of cooperation at 
all. Within the issue of climate change this incentive is even more perti-
nent as one state might profit more from cooperating than not if all others 
cooperate, but the benefits are even higher if all but him cooperate, 
creating a powerful incentive to free-ride.  
There are, however, some silver linings on the horizon. The Montreal 
Protocol succeeded after all and many have looked to it for guidance. 
Nations tend to stick to agreements if they are ‘self-enforcing’ (Barrett 
1994), providing an overall benefit to a country. Furthermore, whereas 
many games of cooperation assume players to be symmetric, they certain-
ly are asymmetric when it comes to climate change. These asymmetries 
boost the impact that side-payments, monetary or non-monetary, can have 
on cooperation.  
Many argue that technology should play a more important role than it 
does today to combat human induced climate change. More specifically, 
technology transfer to countries that do not possess the technical skills to 
develop them locally but will be responsible for much of the increase in 
emissions in the future will be important.  
The first question this report seeks to address is if such a technology 
transfer scheme is already in place. A tentative result is that there is no 
such mechanism in place. The logical question to ask is then what such a 
mechanism could look like. Finally, this report will address the issue if 
such a transfer can increase cooperation as a side-payment in a new cli-
mate change treaty. 
The next section will lay the theoretic foundations for the following anal-
ysis. It will offer an introduction of environmental-, resource-, 
development economic literature that is related to the issue of technology 
transfer, research and development of technology, and climate change. 
One part will also be concerned with literature on international coopera-
tion and game theory. All parts together should constitute a theoretic 
basis on which to build an effective climate change agreement. 
In the third section the Kyoto protocol will be analyzed based on the 
economic foundations from chapter one in order to see if it was effective 
to address the issue of climate change. The three mechanisms of the pro-
tocol will receive special attention, as they are the only part of the 
protocol that addresses technology transfer in some fashion. Section four 
contains an analysis of the Asian Pacific Partnership on Clean Develop-
ment, especially with respect to recent literature in resource economics.  
In section five the main contribution of this report will be introduced, a 
largely self-conceived technology transfer mechanism under a new cli-
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mate change agreement with abatement requirement for both developed 
and developing countries. The mechanism will be analyzed in section six 
with a simple game with asymmetric players to explore the most import-
ant frictions it will face when trying to increase cooperation in a climate 
change agreement. Chapter seven concludes.  
2 Theory and Background  
2.1 Public Goods, a Global Stable Climate and R&D 
A pure public good is commonly defined by two properties: Non-exclud-
ability and non-rivalry (Perman et al., 2003). Non-excludability means 
that no one can be excluded from the consumption of a good. Non-rivalry 
implies that consumption by one agent does not come at the expense of 
the consumption by another agent. The classical example of such a good 
is national defense. No resident of a country can be excluded from its 
consumption, as in being protected from foreign and domestic foes. 
Furthermore, consumption by one resident however defined in the 
context of defense, does not preclude others from being defended. In the 
case of defense, all agents have an incentive not to contribute to its 
provision since once it is available they do not have to pay any additional 
fee to enjoy the consumption of it. States can overcome this behavior by 
levying taxes on its citizens and punishing tax evasion severely. 
All public goods have inherent externalities that would lead to their under 
provision, if left to market outcomes without a regulation agency. Extern-
alities can also occur in the case of private goods. In general: ‘An extern-
al effect, or externality, is said to occur when the production or consump-
tion decisions of one agent have an impact on the utility or profit of 
another agent in an unintended way’ (Perman et al. 2003, p.134).  
This report is mainly concerned with the global public good nature of a 
stable climate. Consumption of a stable climate has been non-rivalrous 
for most of human history as consumption of stable weather by, for ex-
ample, an American farmer does not preclude their European counter-
parts to enjoy a largely predictable season that allows them to plan their 
harvest and planting cycles. This line of argumentation implies that a 
stable climate can be seen as natural capital in the process of production 
(Perman et al. 2003). Without a stable climate humanity would find it 
hard to exist and production of any goods would be difficult. Also, non-
excludability is given as it is up until now technically impossible to 
‘restrict’ the usage of a stable climate in a specific region in the world.  
With the advent of the industrial revolution humanity started to emit mas-
sive amounts of climate relevant gases into the atmosphere, notably CO2. 
This happened without taking into account the negative effects that this 
might have on a global stable climate. The first to mention that human 
activity might have an impact on the climate was Baron Jean-Baptiste 
Fourier in 1827 (Fourier 1827). A first estimate of the exact magnitude of 
this impact was published by Svante Arrenhenius in 1896 (Arrhenius 
1896). ‘The first official recognition came from the US President’s Sci-
ence Advisory Committee in 1965 when, amongst other things, it noted 
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that climate change could be caused by human activities and could have 
important consequences’ (Agrawal 1998, p.606). In the second half of the 
1970s the argument was advanced that more CO2 emissions would 
actually lead to a cooling (IPCC 2007a). This was later refuted and it was 
found that it were in fact aerosols that were emitted alongside CO2 that 
were responsible for this phenomenon. ‘95% of all the climate change 
science literature since 1834 was published after 1951’ (IPCC 2007a, 
p.98). Climate gases once emitted, stay in the atmosphere for a long-time, 
about 25% is likely to stay in the atmosphere indefinitely (Archer 2005). 
This makes climate relevant emissions a stock pollution problem in that if 
more emissions are released than naturally decay, the stock of emissions 
increases. Emissions by one country do not only impact its own climate 
but have a global effect, since it is the accumulation of greenhouse gases 
worldwide that changes the climate. This makes the problem of human 
induced climate change a transboundary environmental problem. There is 
current scientific consensus that if the emission concentration surpasses 
550ppm CO2 the increase in global temperatures will be beyond the criti-
cal level of 2 degrees by the middle of the century (Stern 2007). Costs in 
terms of forgone economic growth and damages would in this case most 
likely be substantial. Optimally then, to preserve a stable climate and to 
avoid the loss of economic growth in the future, emission levels should 
not reach this level taking the natural rate of decay into account.  
As the negative stock externality that climate gases have has not been 
sufficiently taken into account so far by polluting agents, a variety of 
interventions can be applied to internalize this effect. For example, by 
levying a tax on the usage of fossil energy, the cutting of rain forests and 
other climate gases related activities. The optimal level of greenhouse gas 
emission can be fine-tuned by the tax, as this makes emissions more 
expensive. Market mechanisms should then lead to a substitution away 
from production inputs that emit greenhouse gases. Allocating emission 
permits to all countries at a level that would avoid drastic climate change 
is the second common solution offered by environmental economic 
theory. This would establish a shadow-price on the usage of fossil fuels in 
terms of abatement cost. By allowing permit trade to take place, the mar-
ginal cost of abatement would be equalized globally rendering this an 
efficient solution (Perman et al. 2003). But for most of the time since the 
industrial revolution began these options have been safely ignored, either 
due to non-awareness of the stock nature of the problem or the absence of 
international cooperation which will be discussed in more detail below.  
The second important externality issue related to climate change concerns 
the research and development (R&D) of technologies that help to adapt or 
mitigate climate change. The output of R&D is knowledge. Knowledge in 
economic theory is commonly classified as a pure public good. Once pro-
duced, no one can be excluded from acquiring it without further protec-
tive measures such as patents that credit the inventor. Usage of know-
ledge by one person does not preclude others from using it, making it 
non-rivalarous. Knowledge is then produced at a socially sub-optimal 
level as producers cannot recover their investment as no one is willing to 
pay for something that is available for free (Jaffe et al. 2005). To over-
come this problem, producers of knowledge are granted patents that allow 
them to restrict access to knowledge and thus recover their investment.  
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Concerning the issue of R&D related to global environmental problems, 
Hoel (2005) shows that if countries only consider the impact that R&D 
has on their own economy whereas the real effect is global, R&D levels 
on climate technology are sub-optimal. Without an international agree-
ment, countries will only equate the marginal benefit of R&D with the 
marginal environmental costs within their own borders. But R&D can 
lower abatement costs globally. Climate technology might still reach 
other countries due to spill-over effects, but this is a second best outcome 
as countries will not take this into account when considering on their 
level of R&D expenditure.  
Technological spill-overs can also reduce the ‘leakage’ effect which 
occurs when not all countries are part to an international agreement that 
specifies binding emission reductions (Golombek and Hoel 2005). Re-
duced demand for inputs that emit greenhouse gases when used in a 
country or sector lowers the international price of these production inputs. 
The reduced price will then create the incentives for those countries or 
sectors affected by the agreement to increase their use of the good, 
increasing emission levels and lowering thereby the effectiveness of any 
such agreement. Addressing the two issues of global public goods de-
scribed can only be achieved via international cooperation. Reasons for 
the absence of cooperation and ways to improve the likelihood of it are 
discussed in the next section.  
2.2 International Cooperation 
Solving transboundary issues of pollution requires cooperation from at 
least two states, in the case of climate change cooperation from most of 
the world (Stern 2007). In contrast to pollution issues that happen within 
the borders of a state, there is no agency that can force states to adhere to 
agreements made between them unless they delegate that role to an inter-
national agency and decide to give up sovereignty. In the case of human 
induced climate change this has not happened so far. Agreements must 
then be ‘self-enforcing’ if they are to be effective (Barrett 1994; Wagner 
2001). Agreements are self-enforcing when two conditions are fulfilled. 
First of all, the payoff for a country must not be driven below the non-
cooperative level. Secondly: ‘… the agreement (must) not be vulnerable 
to free-riding and deviant behavior by individual countries or sub-
coalitions of countries’. (Wagner 2001, p.384). It is then said to be a 
stable agreement as participation is the best alternative for the member.  
However, the incentive to cooperation may decrease the more countries 
are part to an agreement. It usually pays for countries to cooperate as 
compared to non-cooperation, but it pays even more if everybody else 
continues to cooperate and one country leaves the agreement: ‘The larger 
are the potential gains to cooperation, the greater are the benefits of free-
riding and so the larger are the incentives to defect’ (Perman et al. 2003, 
p.310).  
This is similar to the outcome of a prisoner’s dilemma game. In this one-
shot game, the payoff for cooperation to both players is higher than the 
payoff for defection by both parties, but the highest payoff is obtained 
when one player defects and the other cooperates, the defecting one 
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receiving the larger payoff. As both have an incentive to defect, none of 
them can be assured of cooperation in a non-cooperative setting. The 
Nash-equilibrium is then defection by both players. A more formal analy-
sis of this will be given in chapter five. Assuming that countries act as 
rational players in the case of an international agreement on climate 
change this will lead to a low number of signatories as they expect defec-
tion which in turn decreases their benefit from cooperation. The problem 
of human induced climate change is a good example of this scenario with 
some special properties. Since it is a global stock problem, the benefits of 
one country abating are spread to all countries, which implies that one 
country is not able to appropriate completely the benefits of its own 
abatement. Furthermore, the benefits are only occurring in the future 
which reduces the benefit of abating today even further when taking dis-
counting into account.  
Free-riding can also be a problem in treaties even if they have a high 
level of participation. A consensus treaty is self-enforcing and has a high 
level participation, but the abatement level that signatories have to fulfill 
is below the cooperative outcome (Barrett 1999). A treaty of this kind is 
designed to get as many countries on board as possible, but comes at the 
price of lowering abatement levels to a point that everyone can agree on. 
In this scenario all signatories are collectively free-riding. In order to 
move from this impasse the benefits of cooperation must increase while 
the cost of defecting must to do so as well.  
The economic development of all rich economies today has been heavily 
reliant on the use of fossil fuels without the before mentioned externality 
priced into their usage. In 1994 the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) entered into force when more than 
50 parties had ratified it, which was agreed upon at the Earth Summit in 
Rio in 1992. To this date 192 countries have ratified the convention. By 
signing, countries took on a ‘non-binding aim to reduce atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases with the goal of “preventing danger-
ous anthropogenic interference with Earth's climate system”’.1 The con-
vention also specified that developing countries would not have to re-
structure their economies away from reliance on fossil fuels unless 
developed countries would provide sufficient funds and technology. This 
concept has also been embedded in the Kyoto Protocol which entered into 
force in February 2005.In it, member parties endorse the ‘common but 
differentiated’ approach which puts the burden of financing mitigation 
and adaptation on industrialized countries 2Most of the increase in emis-
sions in the future will be coming from developing countries. The effort 
of developed countries alone, as specified in the Kyoto Protocol, will not 
be sufficient to stabilize emissions at a non-critical level or only does so 
at a prohibitively high cost (Stern 2007).  
Another way of increasing the benefits of accession to an agreement is 
via side-payments, commonly referred to as ‘carrots’. Side-payments 
                                                     
1
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Framework_Convention_on_Cli 
mate_Change 
2
 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 
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have been shown to be particularly powerful if there is asymmetry be-
tween nations: ‘The conventional wisdom that self-enforcing IEAs (Inter-
national Environmental Agreements) can not achieve substantial gains 
when the gains to cooperation are large does not hold when nations are 
asymmetric’ (McGinty 2006, p.4). Intuitively, asymmetry allows for larg-
er transfers of wealth than symmetric conditions. These transfers can help 
to increase cooperation.  
Asymmetry in the context of climate change can be linked to at least 
three dimensions. Firstly, the marginal costs of abatement differ substan-
tially among countries with developed countries having relatively high 
costs and developing countries having relatively low costs (Ellerman et 
al. 1998; Nordhaus 1998). Secondly, the level of R&D activity related to 
green technology. This issue will be discussed at length in the next sec-
tion, but the main result that emerges is that green technology is largely 
developed in rich democracies. Finally, developing nations are likely to 
suffer more from damages than developed ones (Stern 2007; IPCC 
2007b).  
McGinty (2006) focuses on the first asymmetry and suggests that trans-
fers should be implemented ‘through a system of tradable pollution per-
mits which will equate the marginal abatement costs…’ (p.8). When car-
rying out simulations for 20 nations he finds that exploiting asymmetry 
under the aforementioned transfer scheme can reduce the free-rider incen-
tive significantly as compared to the symmetric case. Barrett (2003) puts 
the asymmetry into the Ozone depletion context. He assumes that nations 
further away from the equator have more to gain from the treaty as they 
will suffer more due to lighter skin color, and depletion being more pro-
nounced the further away a country is from the equator. His findings are 
similar in that asymmetry combined with side-payments substantially in-
creases the number of signatories to an agreement compared to the non-
cooperative symmetric situation. 
In the case of the Montreal Protocol on the protection of the ozone layer, 
developing countries are reimbursed the incremental cost of accession to 
the treaty. Incremental costs are those that occur once a party accedes to 
an agreement. For developing countries, acceding to the agreement then 
came at no cost. This mechanism was instrumental in increasing the num-
ber of participants. But there was also a cost to non-accession: trade 
sanctions. Non-acceding parties could suffer from trade sanctions as trade 
between parties and non-parties on chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) substances 
or goods including them should be restricted. The power of this ‘stick’ is 
increasing in the number of parties to the agreements as this means larger 
restrictions. Trade-restriction in this case had the advantage that by not 
trading CFC containing substances, parties effectively shielded them 
from the problem of leakage (Barrett 2007). Relocating to a location that 
allowed CFC containing production was not profitable since with a high 
rate of participation there was no market to sell the products to. The 
cumulative impact of this ‘stick’ and ‘carrot’ was to increase cooperation 
significantly. The incremental cost clause was added to the agreement in 
1990 and soon after important developing countries such as India and 
China joined the agreement (Barrett 2003).  
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Technology transfer as side-payment mechanism in a new climate change 
agreement seems to have potential to increase cooperation, as it did in the 
Montreal protocol. But how should a transfer pattern look like? Where is 
green technology actually developed? What institutions are essential in its 
development? These questions are addressed in the next section.  
2.3 On the Development and Distribution of Green Technology  
The development of advanced technology takes largely place in rich dem-
ocratic countries (Acemoglu et al. 2006; Aghion et al. 2007). For exam-
ple, about 70% of the technology that is currently transferred under the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol comes 
from Japan, Germany, the USA, France, and Great Britain (Seres 2007). 
Certain factors that are common to most democracies seem to be instru-
mental for the development of these technologies. First, democracies are 
better at providing public goods such as good quality infrastructure and 
funding for public research which are vital ingredients to technological 
advancement (Mesquita et al., 2003; Aghion et al. 2007). Secondly, they 
provide a more competitive environment than autocratic states by keeping 
the cost of entry for companies which want to enter a sector at a lower 
level (Aghion et al. 2007). Finally, they provide a more secure legal envi-
ronment which allows companies to appropriate the profits from their 
research (Mesquita et al., 2003).  
What are the driving factors that lead to a superior performance of demo-
cracies in the field of green technology? Kuznets (1955) made the predic-
tion that income inequality would increase in the early stages of econom-
ic development and then later decrease again, thus follow an inverted U-
shape. In the beginning of the 1990’s when environmental data became 
more readily available a similar argument was made with respect to the 
quality of the environment. It was argued that in the early stages of 
economic development, environmental pollution tended to increase and in 
later stages this development would be reversed, thus following a similar 
pattern as the income -inequality development relationship (Grossman 
and Krueger 1991; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992; Panayotou 1993). 
One of the basic arguments made as to why this phenomenon is observed 
is that in the early stages green technology is not available or is prohibit-
ively expensive, thus abatement does not take place. Another line of rea-
soning argues that in the early stages agriculture and resource intensive 
industry are the pre-dominant economic activities, whereas in later stages 
it is informational and services industries that dominate which are less 
natural resource intensive and produce less waste (Dinda 2004). Further-
more, a common observed phenomenon when it comes to increasing 
material wealth is that people start to attach more value to things that go 
beyond the basics needs, such as environmental quality. Finally, countries 
with higher incomes tend to invest more into R&D which often leads to 
the replacement of dirty technologies with greener options (Komen et al. 
1997). 
There are four important qualifications to the basic arguments (Arrow et 
al. 1995). First, the relationship holds mostly for pollutants that have 
local short-term costs but not for pollutants that involve long-term costs 
and dispersed effects. Second, the relationship seems only to hold for 
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flow pollutants whereas stock pollutants do not seem to fit the pattern. 
Third, there might be a leakage effect in that the reduction of a pollutant 
in one country or sector can lead to the increase in another country or sec-
tor. This is essentially the leakage argument as discussed above. Finally, 
reduction in pollutants usually goes hand in hand with better environ-
mental regulation that stems from institutional change. The argument is 
then that it is not first and foremost the increases in preference for 
environmental quality that is the driving factor behind the environmental 
Kuznets curve, but the ability of a society to translate these preferences 
into better environmental institutions that drive the development. As with 
respect to the effect of democracy on this phenomenon it is argued that 
‘Institutional changes triggered by citizens’ demand for cleaner environ-
ments are more likely to occur in democratic countries’ (Dinda 2004, p. 
444).  
Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that in stable democracies it is by far easier 
to win election with policies aimed towards the public, then by pleasing a 
small circle of cronies. In autocracies, a small circle might be enough to 
ensure the survival of the government, such as high ranking officials in 
vital military positions. But in democracies where power is less concen-
trated in the hands of a few the relevant electoral is not the small circle of 
cronies but a large part of the citizens. Bribing every citizen is then 
prohibitively expensive and it pays to embark on visible public policies. 
Polluting companies certainly benefit from not having to pay for the ex-
ternality they cause to the neighbourhood or to the global climate, at least 
in the short-term. The cost are then borne by the public and a regulator is 
needed to enforce the property rights of the public to a clean environ-
ment, dismissing the case of the company claiming that it has the right to 
pollute and citizens are to pay for not suffering from it. Such enforcement 
of property rights usually necessitates a functioning legal system and low 
levels of corruption. Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that an independent 
legal system is only in the interest of the government if the size of the 
electorate is large enough to switch its focus towards public policies. 
Also, the scientific expertise necessary to detect environmental pollution 
and create sufficient documentation to bring the case before courts neces-
sitates expertise that is usually obtained at the tertiary level of education. 
Mesquita et al. (2003) present statistic evidence that it is the tertiary level 
of education that represents the gravest risk to autocratic regimes.  
Autocratic regimes are often characterized by high endemic levels of cor-
ruption. Besides raising the cost of doing business and making the judi-
cial process less reliable, corruption requires a certain level of secrecy 
which means that the less people that are involved the better. This will 
reduce the number of firms active in a market and even more so the num-
ber of foreign firms entering (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Since they are 
often drivers of innovation, the secrecy necessary to carry out corruption 
is a further factor inhibiting innovation and the development of new tech-
nologies. In technologically advanced sectors, having superior technology 
is often the decisive competitive advantage (Aghion et al. 2007). By 
ensuring competition in these sectors, companies are then more likely to 
develop better technology in order to keep or acquire an advantage. 
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Cohen and Levinthal (1989) argue that a firm’s ability to appropriate 
research depends on its own R&D activity and that publicly available 
knowledge can increase a firm’s ability to do so. Additionally, the more 
complex technology becomes the more R&D activity is required to adopt 
it. Then if democracies ensure competition in an environment that has 
reached a high level of technology, firms will continue to invest in R&D 
in order to be able to adopt advances in technology.  
Another important issue in this context is spill-overs. As argued above, 
spill-overs discourage investment into R&D as a company is not able to 
appropriate all of the benefits of its R&D. But if R&D helps to catch the 
spill-over from other companies, then spill-overs might actually encour-
age R&D in order to be able to appropriate the research of others.  
Rich and democratic countries are the main developers of green technol-
ogy (Komen et al. 1997; Aghion et al. 2007). This is not likely to change 
soon as changes in political institutions as well as changes in wealth 
necessary to promote R&D for green technology at a sufficient level 
often takes decades. In sum, the empirical phenomenon of the environ-
mental Kuznets curve seems largely driven by institutional factors and 
does not hold for all pollutants, most importantly not the main pollutants 
driving human induced climate change. Nevertheless, countries with 
democratic institutions seem better equipped to master the problems relat-
ed to this global problem as they can translate environmental preferences 
of their citizens better into effective policies than autocracies. As most of 
the increase in emissions will be coming from developing nations, tech-
nology transfer will be a vital component of any effort to avoid or miti-
gate drastic climate change. But since it is a vital component of any 
strategy that seeks to avoid or mitigate climate change and as most of the 
increase in emissions will come from developing countries, technology 
transfer will have to take place. What criteria can be applied in order to 
evaluate the success chances of technology transfer? What are the bene-
fits besides the reduction in emissions? These questions are dealt with in 
the following section 
2.4 Success Conditions for Technology Transfer and Benefits 
The Green Revolution in agriculture that started in the 1930’s with re-
search conducted by Norman Borlaug reaching Asia and Africa in the 
60’s and 70’s, serves as an illustrative example concerning the success 
conditions for technology transfer. It was by far more successful in Asia 
than in Africa and a substantial part of the divergence in results can be 
attributed to the different educational levels in the two continents (Kapur 
and Crowley 2008). Local universities and research institutions played a 
decisive role in adopting the technologies to local circumstances: ‘Thus, 
in the absence of domestic skills, even global public goods (embodied in 
this case in the green revolution technologies) have very limited payoffs’. 
(Kapur and Crowley 2008, p.13)  
As argued above, tertiary education poses a significant threat to a regime. 
Therefore, a high level of tertiary education among the population is 
more likely to be observed in countries with democratic institutions. 
What drives this result? University education generates externalities for 
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society at large that are hard to quantify (Kapur and Crowley 2008).For 
example, a stronger belief in freedom and universality. The presence of 
externalities would lead to an underprovision of tertiary education if no 
intervention by the state takes place. In addition, these values challenge 
the foundation of any oppressive regime which makes sub-optimal 
provision even more likely. A look at the current scale of public funding 
when it comes to tertiary education reveals that this problem has been 
recognized (OECD 2007). 
Another variable that plays an important role when it comes to the suc-
cess of technology transfer is the level of corruption. Vishny and Shleifer 
(1993) argue that in countries with high levels of corruption there is an 
unusually high demand for technology that is too advanced given the 
technological level and skills present. However, it is much easier to col-
lect bribes on too advanced expensive technology than on technology that 
can be supplied by several producers. Especially if aid money is used in 
the process which would require several potential suppliers biding for the 
contract, choosing a technology that is only supplied by one company and 
much more expensive is the more attractive option. Empirical studies 
have shown that corruption and other institutional variables are highly 
correlated with tertiary education and vice versa (Mesquita 2003, Kauf-
mann et al.2005). For example, low levels of corruption are often found 
in countries with a high level of education and a reliable rule of law. How 
exactly these variables influence each other and how the causality runs is 
still subject to research. However, this indicates that the before mentioned 
institutional variables can serve as indicators of the success chances of 
technology transfer. On a more general level, the International Environ-
mental Technology Transfer Board established several criteria that can 
help to determine the success of technology transfer (MacDonald 1992). 
First of all, there should be local demand for the technology. Secondly, 
local entities must be informed about the availability of technology which 
requires a good informational network. Thirdly, a supporting infrastruc-
ture must be in place both in terms of capital and trained labour. Fourthly, 
the transfer must be economically viable in that it strengthens the local 
economy. Fifthly, there must be sufficient financing, especially in the 
initial stages of the project. Finally, the technology must be appropriate to 
the context which can be facilitated by cooperation with local research 
institutions.  
 What are the potential benefits of technology transfer? Develop-
ing economies often experience increasing returns to scale in the initial 
stages of development (Murphy et al. 1989). In the model that Murphy et 
al. (1989) present, there are several industrial producers, none of which 
can produce profitably unless others use and pay for public infrastructure 
as well. Furthermore, one industrial producer creates demand for the 
others’ products by paying a wage above the agricultural wage level 
which allows for spending on more industrial goods. This is a variant of 
the Big-Push argument introduced first by Rostein-Roda (1943) that co-
ordinated investment can help to jump-start industrialization when for 
each producer individually it is rational to not embark on this path. 
A relevant question is what kind of energy infrastructure will be erected 
to support the process of industrialization. To this day most developing 
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countries and especially the larger ones such as China, India and Brazil 
have predominately based their energy infrastructure on fossil fuels (IEA 
2008). This can partially be attributed to considerable subsidies for fossil 
fuels, missing development of green technology locally and missing in-
formation about the availability of such technology from developed 
countries (MacDonald 1992; Darmstadter 2002). Technology transfer can 
help to turn resolve the issue of missing information and locally missing 
development. Subsidies are however a political issue and face potentially 
the largest obstacle to a green-energy infrastructure. 
In conclusion, technology transfer can have a substantial positive impact 
on the development of a poor country. But often in the past it has failed to 
achieve its full-potential due to lack of consideration of institutional 
factors that play an important role in determining its success and the lack 
of understanding of how to change these institutions over time.  
2.5 Resource Markets and Green Technology 
One of the most important results in the resource economics literature is 
the Hotelling rule (Hotelling 1931). It derives the optimal development of 
the price of a non-renewable resource over time depending on certain 
assumption. Assuming zero extraction costs, the price of a non-renewable 
resource should increase at the social rate of discount. This is the inter-
temporal efficiency condition for an efficient extraction path. One impli-
cation of this is that the discounted price of the natural resource is con-
stant over time, which is a reformulation of the general asset-efficiency 
condition. The Hotelling rule is then a necessary dynamic efficiency con-
dition, but sufficiency is only achieved when one also considers the static 
efficiency requirements. Static efficiency in this context requires that 
whatever use a resource is put to, its marginal value should be equal to 
the marginal value of the resource stock in situ (Perman et al. 2003). In 
situ means resources left in the ground. Resource owners are then indif-
ferent between extracting the resource in order to invest the proceeds and 
leaving the resource in the ground.  
There are four main complications that run counter to the assumptions 
made when deriving the Hotelling rule when confronting it with actual 
properties of non-renewable resource stocks. Firstly, the total stock of a 
resource is usually not known with certainty (Perman et al. 2003). Sec-
ondly, over time there will be new discoveries. Thirdly, there is a differ-
ence between the total stock available and that which is economically 
viable to extract. Finally, R&D can change extraction costs, replace the 
non-renewable resource by a renewable one and can give a clearer image 
of the damages expected from extraction.  
The Hotelling rule is of significant relevance concerning the issue of 
human induced climate change since the emissions causing it come from 
non-renewable resources. By considering the Hotelling rule and the four 
mentioned complications one can arrive at an extraction pattern which 
corresponds to different emission scenarios. Since we are considering a 
stock problem, the goal should be to flatten the extraction path of non-
renewable resources that emit greenhouse relevant gases and thereby 
lowering the amount of emissions at every point in time (Sinn 2007). 
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Sinn considers several policy measures that are available to achieve this 
outcome. By announcing a decrease in the ad-valorem tax today, govern-
ments would provide producers with an incentive to extract at a later 
point in time. The problem of this policy lies in fact that governments 
would have to commit to reducing taxes in the future, which is problem-
atic at best. A second measure is a constant unit tax on carbon extraction. 
In order to be effective it should be constant over time and it should be 
applied uniformly world wide in order to avoid leakage effects. Another 
solution would be to subsidize the in situ stock, in effect paying resource 
owners to not extract. The political infeasibility of paying quasi-regimes 
that already derive large resource rents renders this option unfeasible. 
Taxing capital income would slow down the rate of extraction as invest-
ment of resource derived income becomes less attractive. This could 
however lead to a sub-optimal accumulation of capital in the world 
economy. A more viable step would be to close tax havens in order to 
ensure equal taxation of resource owners.  
Sinn also makes the argument that if resource owners feel unsafe about 
their property rights, they will increase the speed of extraction as they 
cannot be sure that they will be able to derive income from the resource 
in the future. Finally, binding emission constraints reduce the price of the 
resource because they lower the demand for emission related products by 
increasing the price of the final product. By setting an upper limit to 
allowed emissions and by sufficiently broad participation a ceiling would 
be established that ensures that critical limits will not be reached. Since 
the Kyoto protocol currently only restraints a minority of worldwide 
emissions a more inclusive climate change agreement is necessary to 
render this strategy effective. Without broad participation lower prices for 
fossil fuels in one region will increase the demand for them in others, the 
leakage effect.  
What is the impact of better green technology development and disper-
sion? Abatement costs will be lowered and the incentives to switch from 
fossil to renewable fuels will increase. The effects are illustrated in  
Figure 2.1 (see next page), adopted from Perman et al. (2003). 
More R&D and better dispersion of green technology are likely to reduce 
the cost of abatement and encourage the usage of clean fuels as compared 
to fossil fuels as their price decreases, the backstop price in the figure. 
With a lower backstop price PB , given the demand curve D, the resource 
owner can only charge PB at the end of the extraction period since above 
this price all consumers will switch to the backstop technology. Two 
important assumptions underlying this figure are that all of the resource 
will be extracted and that the backstop technology is available in amounts 
that can satisfy any level of demand for it. The curvature of the curve that 
describes the development of the net price over time is determined by the 
social discount rate, following Hotelling’s rule. The fall in the backstop 
price does not change the social discount rate. Therefore, the curvature or 
increase over time does not change. Given the same increase of price over 
time, the initial price P0 has to drop to P’0 , in order to reach PB at a point 
when all of the resource is extracted. The lower price of the non-
renewable resource at all points in time as compared to before encourages 
more consumption. As the total stock of the resource has not changed, 
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this implies that the resource will be extracted at an earlier point in time. 
The extraction schedule is described in the quadrant R/T, where R stand 
for the amount extracted at a certain point in time.  
Figure 2.1 Effect of a fall in the price of a renewable energy technol-
ogy on the consumption of a non-renewable energy source 
Source: Perman et al. 2003 
A consequence of this result when we consider fossil fuels is more green-
house gas emission in a shorter period of time. But demand for fossil 
fuels in general will decline due to the lower price of renewable options. 
Depending which of these effects dominates the time to total extraction of 
the non-renewable resource may eventually be longer or shorter (Hoel 
2008). Without an international agreement in place that puts a ceiling on 
the maximum amount emissions, better technology policy by itself is 
unlikely to help avoiding drastic climate change (Sinn 2007; Hoel 2008). 
Combating human induced climate change in order to avoid excessive 
economic costs will necessitate a substantial increase in technology trans-
fer compared to the level we observe at the moment due to the expected 
increase in emissions from developing countries and the pattern of devel-
opment of green technology. This transfer will have to be part of an 
international agreement that also includes emission limits, most likely for 
developing and developed countries. Such an agreement should include 
as many countries as possible in order to strengthen the overall effective-
ness in terms of avoidance of excessive costs. The next two chapters will 
analyse the two currently most important international treaties on interna-
tional climate change, showing their shortcomings and potential for syn-
ergies, based on the pre-ceding discussion.  
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3 The Kyoto Protocol 
3.1 Introduction 
Adopted on December 11th 1997, the Kyoto protocol is an international 
environmental agreement that seeks to limit global greenhouse gas emis-
sions in the face of human induced climate change. It came into force on 
the 16th February 2005 when at least 55 parties covering 55% of the in-
dustrialized countries’ green house gas emission of 1990 had ratified, 
accepted, approved and acceded to it. Whereas countries member to the 
convention are only encouraged to reduce their emission, the protocol 
commits them to do so. The first phase of emission reductions is sched-
uled to run for 5 years from 2008 to 2012. In this phase the overall goal is 
to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions of industrialized countries, or 
Annex I countries, by 5.2%. As historical emission levels are quite di-
verse, different reduction obligations have been assigned to countries. For 
example, whereas the EU is expected to reduce its emissions by 8% and 
Japan by 6%, Russia is allowed to stay emit at his 1990 level. Developing 
or Annex II countries are exempted from emission reduction. This ex-
emption is embedded in the protocol under the ‘common but different-
iated approach’ which takes into account historical emission patters. 
Under this approach, the burden of financing the mitigation and adapta-
tion falls on the industrialized countries. As of January 2009 the Kyoto 
Protocol covers 63.7% of industrialized countries’ emission in 19903. 
In order to lower the cost of compliance to the protocol in absence of 
developing countries which would provide a large amount of emission 
permits, two flexible mechanisms are part of the protocol. The first is the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), where agents from industrial-
ized countries can engage in projects in developing countries that help to 
reduce emission, thereby gaining emission credits at a lower cost than in 
their domestic market. An important requirement for a CDM project to be 
approved is the ‘additionality’ requirement in that it reduces emissions of 
the project over what would have occurred without the CDM. The second 
flexible mechanism is the Joint Implementation mechanism (JI). Projects 
under this mechanism have to fulfill similar requirements as the CDM. 
Whereas CDM projects can be carried out between Annex I and Annex II 
parties, countries with emission restrictions and without emission restric-
tions, JI can only be carried out between Annex I countries. 
3.2 Analysis 
The protocol in its current form does not have a favorable cost-benefit 
ratio for Annex I countries when contrasting the costs that they have to 
incur in order to fulfill their abatement obligations, in comparison to the 
probable benefits they derive from damages avoided in the future. 
Whereas this cost-benefit ratio was 1:11 for the Montreal Protocol for the 
participating industrialized countries, this ratio stands at 1:0.5 for the 
Kyoto Protocol for Annex I parties (Barrett 2007). These numbers rely on 
results from estimations carried out by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). They 
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recently revised their numbers and the ratio now stands at 1:1.7 (Nord-
haus 2008). Eventhough this renders overall action profitable, it does so 
only marginally compared to the Montreal Protocol. An aspect that made 
the Montreal protocol so effective was that all its parties profited consid-
erably from it (Barrett 2003). One important factor that makes the Kyoto 
Protocol so expensive for Annex I countries is that developing countries 
have no abatement obligations and are therefore not participating in the 
emission market. Abatement in developing countries is generally cheaper 
than in developed countries (Ellerman et al. 1998; Nordhaus and Boyer 
1998). If these countries were bound by emission limits and offered their 
permits on the international permit market it would be considerably 
cheaper for actors in developed countries to abate. Nordhaus and Boyer 
(1998), using the RICE-98 model in order to determine the costs of the 
protocol, find that the US would have to pay two thirds of the total cost of 
the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. They also find that without the 
inclusion of developing countries and effective enforcement, the cost of 
permit per ton of CO2 is likely to rise over 250$ throughout this century. 
Finally, the further mitigation and adaptation measures are postponed in 
the future the more will cost increase, likely so at an increasing rate 
(Stern 2007).  
As mentioned above, the world does not only suffer a global externality 
from climate changing emissions but also a lack of environmental related 
R&D that deals with climate change relevant emissions. That externality 
is not sufficiently addressed in the Kyoto protocol. There is no mechan-
ism that would allow countries to take into account the global effect that 
their environmental related R&D has which will lead to an underprovi-
sion (Hoel 2005). Countries will only consider the reduction in abatement 
costs that their R&D has at home if there is an international agreement 
regulating emissions without R&D provisions. If there is no international 
agreement regulating emissions they will consider the benefit that envi-
ronmental R&D, has on indicators such as companies’ profits or on local-
ly relevant pollutants within national jurisdiction. The optimal provision 
of knowledge at home is already negatively influenced by the knowledge 
externality discussed above. The effect of R&D is a reduction in marginal 
abatement cost. As long as this is only set equal to the countries’ mar-
ginal abatement cost whereas a new technology has a truly global poten-
tial, the effort exerted will be sub-optimal. Even if the permit trade that 
takes place under the Kyoto Protocol equalizes marginal abatement costs 
in participating regions and induces more environmental R&D as a mar-
ket ‘pull’ effect (Jaffe et al. 2005; Lawrence 2007), the level is still likely 
to be insufficient: ‘… there will be too little R&D expenditure in the 
Kyoto type agreement even if total emissions are set equal to what they 
are in the first-best optimum’ (Hoel 2005, p.59). Furthermore, the permit 
trade does not have any provisions in itself addressing the issue of 
technology transfer between Annex I and Annex II parties. Technology 
transfer may take place through technological spill-overs, but most likely 
at levels that are insufficient.  
The only way in which technology transfer is somehow addressed in the 
protocol is via its two other mechanisms, the CDM and JI. Yet tech-
nology transfer is not a necessary condition for projects under these 
mechanisms to take place. The mechanism has only been operating fairly 
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recently. A study by Seres (2007) finds that about 39% of CDM projects 
claim to involve technology transfer. What exactly is meant by technol-
ogy transfer is not specified under CDM regulations. These projects are 
responsible for 64% of all emission reductions achieved under CDM, 
which points to the fact that it is often large projects that involve tech-
nology transfer. About 56% of projects that involve technology transfer 
claim to transfer equipment and knowledge, 32% involve only know-
ledge. Projects with knowledge transfer alone account for about 11% of 
all technology transfer projects.  
Even if technology transfer is involved, the mechanisms themselves 
suffer from several inefficiencies that make them unsuitable for achieving 
a reduction in abatement costs that does not change the global amount of 
emission permits. As long as there are no emission limits in place in 
developing countries, CDM projects lowering the demand for fossil fuels 
in one sector of the economy can cause an increase of demand in another, 
the leakage effect mentioned before (Hagem 2009).The mechanisms also 
increase the incentive to reduce the profitability of projects artificially. 
Projects under CDM and JI are only carried out if they fulfill the addi-
tionality criteria, which requires that they would not have been carried 
out without the investment via one of the two mechanisms. This can lead 
to too many projects being actually carried out which may in turn then 
increase total emissions (Wara 2008; Hagem and Holtsmark 2009) 
Investors receive emission credits for the estimated avoided emissions. 
By increasing the estimated emissions of a project, developing country 
entrepreneurs can increase the profitability of the projects for foreign 
investors which will then receive too many emission permits with respect 
to actually avoided emissions. With human induced climate change being 
a stock pollution problem, the overall impact of CDM and JI is inconclu-
sive at best. A possible fix to these problems would be better enforce-
ment. But enforcement comes at the price of higher transaction costs and 
many worthwhile projects especially at a smaller scale are then unlikely 
to be carried out (Hagem 2009). 
Estimates regarding how much developing countries will need in order to 
finance mitigation and adaptation efforts vary between 10-100 billion 
US$ per year: World Bank US$10-40 billion, UNFCCC US$ 28-67 bil-
lion, UNDP US$ 86 billion, Oxfam International US$ 50 billion, Chris-
tian Aid US$ 100 billion (Hægstand and Skjærseth 2009).  
The large variation in the estimated cost is due to the uncertainties inher-
ent in such a theme as climate change, which makes adequate predictions 
of where the damages will take place difficult. Under the Kyoto Protocol 
the Adaption Fund (AF) has been established which derives money from 
a 2% charge on all CDM projects. At the time of writing the fund has just 
become operational and no projects have been supported yet (Hægstand 
and Skjærseth 2009). Financing from other international funds focused on 
the issue amount to 133.4 million US$ represents a substantial gap from 
what is needed. World Bank and UNDP estimates indicate that the finan-
cial basis of the AF can grow rapidly over the next years and might even 
reach US$ 950 million by 2012. But those figures depend on the contin-
ued and better functioning of the CDM mechanism. What a post-Kyoto 
agreement will look like can only be guessed at this time. Considering the 
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drawbacks of CDM and JI described above the question if the fund will 
survive in this form the next round of negotiations should be asked.  
Most of the funds described in the previous section represent public fin-
ance efforts to deal with the problem of poor-country adaptation. In the 
area of technological development and diffusion it is the private sector 
that is of utmost importance and as long as there are not sufficient incen-
tives in place to get it sufficiently engaged it is unlikely that enough funds 
will be provided by public sources (Lawrence 2007). Also, with much of 
the funding for new technologies coming from public funds there is al-
ways the risk of lobbying, or winners picking themselves.  
Another incentive issue concerning technological development when it 
comes to the Kyoto protocol is its relatively short time horizon when 
considering the scale of the problem and uncertainties with regard to the 
outcome of the following negotiations. If private investors are to commit 
to substantial investments they need a longer time horizon (Wagner 
2001). Strategic underinvestment might actually be an outcome of this. 
Countries could claim to have excessive abatement costs, therefore being 
in need of large amounts of permits or little abatement requirements im-
posed on them. Those high costs could be achieved by under-investment 
into environmental R&D (Wagner 2001). Finally, as already noted above 
the Kyoto Protocol has the characteristic of a consensus protocol. The 
emission cuts are not substantial enough to really put a dent to the climate 
change issue since developing countries are not subject to emission 
limits, the cooperative outcome, but they are set at a level that was able to 
include as many parties as possible resulting in collective free-riding. 
(Wagner 2001). 
3.3 Conclusion 
The Kyoto protocol represents the first serious global effort to curb 
greenhouse gases in order to avoid drastic climate change. As such it was 
likely that several short-comings would be discovered in its design and 
there were in fact several significant ones. Firstly, while taking into ac-
count the negative externality of greenhouse gases and addressing this via 
binding emission limits, it fails to take into account the knowledge and 
adaptation externalities. Too little research R&D in green technology is 
carried out on a global scale since countries and entrepreneurs do not 
have incentives for taking into account the global effects of their efforts. 
Secondly, the mechanisms that are addressing these issues, the CDM and 
JI, suffer from bad incentives and it is questionable if they will still exist 
in their current form when the time comes to instate a new agreement. 
Yet one of the funds that is supposed to increase investment into mitiga-
tion and adaptation in developing countries, the AF, relies on funding 
from CDM. This is far from optimal when considering the long-term 
nature that is inherent to many of these investments. Thirdly, since only 
industrialized countries are subject to emission limits the cost-benefit 
ratio is unfavorable. It is largely accepted that developed countries are 
likely to finance most of the adaptation measures necessary in developing 
countries. Developing countries will be responsible for most of the 
increase in emissions in the future (IEA 2008). Coupled with the leakage 
issue it will be necessary to impose some sort of emission limits on devel-
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oping countries as otherwise efforts by industrialized countries are un-
likely to have any effect (Stern 2007). Also, without such limits in place 
Annex II countries will have insufficient incentives to adopt green tech-
nology. It is important to realize these short-comings since the mechan-
isms employed in the Kyoto Protocol are likely to exert a strong influence 
on future climate change agreements. 
4 The Asian-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate 
4.1 Introduction 
First announced at the 38th ASEAN Ministerial in Vientiane, Laos in 
2005 the Asian-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate 
(APP) was officially launched in July 2006. One of the purposes of the 
partnership is to, ‘Create a voluntary, non-legally binding framework for 
international cooperation to facilitate the development, diffusion, deploy-
ment, and transfer of existing, emerging and longer term cost- effective, 
cleaner, more efficient technologies and practices among the Partners 
through concrete and substantial cooperation so as to achieve practical re-
sults’.4 Eight public-private task forces have been created in order to 
achieve this purpose in different sectors. These are: Aluminum, building 
and appliances, cement, cleaner fossil energy, coal mining, power genera-
tion and transmission, renewable energy and distributed generation and 
finally steel. Currently the US, Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, 
India and China are members to the APP. Together, they account for 
more than 50% of global climate change relevant emissions.  
4.2 Analysis 
What can an agreement like the APP achieve theoretically? And what has 
it achieved until now? As mentioned above, pure technology agreements 
are unlikely to achieve much when it comes to emission reductions due to 
the impact that new technologies have on resource markets. A lower 
choke price for non-renewable resources might actually speed up extrac-
tion (Perman 2003; Hoel 2008). Without binding emission limits that are 
enforced, this may lead to more climate change relevant emission over a 
shorter period of time which will result in worsening the climate change 
problem as argued above. Even if the lower price of green technology 
leads to a replacement of fossil fuels and actually lower emissions in that 
country, the global effect may still not be positive. This is due to the leak-
age effect that will encourage consumption of fossil fuels since reduction 
of demand in countries regulated by emission caps or taxes will depress 
the global price.  
This effect is similar to the problem described above concerning the 
CDM since developing countries are not subject to any emission limits. 
Two important sectors that are globally responsible for a large part of 
emission have no task force assigned to them in the APP. The two sectors 
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are agriculture and transportation, responsible for 13.5% and 13.1% re-
spectively of global greenhouse gas emissions. (IPCC, 2007c). With im-
provements occurring in the other sectors, those sectors are likely to 
benefit from lower energy prices. Even though some of the members are 
also part to the Kyoto Protocol and subject to binding emission limits, 
Japan, Australia and Canada all of them are currently far away from 
fulfilling their emission reduction obligations it is unlikely that they will 
achieve them before 20125. 
Spending public money on R&D also comes with a series of problems. 
Governments are in general not good at picking winners, markets often 
do better (Jaffe et al. 2005). Public spending gives politicians the oppor-
tunity to claim that spending and use it as an argument when elections 
come up. Slashing taxes or quantity restriction on industry is less likely to 
be used as an argument for re-election even though it offers the better 
long-term solution (Jaffe et al. 2005). However, there are certain situa-
tions under which the argument for government intervention in this field 
can be advanced. As the global climate is a global good, public spending 
on technological improvements can be justified on similar grounds as 
spending on national defense. Secondly, as some major players are still 
not governed by environmental policy such as emission caps that is by 
many considered the most effective way to encourage development of 
new technology, public spending in this area can fill part of the gap (Jaffe 
et al. 2005).  
In order to stimulate adaptation of new green technologies, two kinds of 
incentives are required. A ‘push’ incentive that can come in the form of 
research, better information or subsidies and a ‘pull’ incentive that can 
come from increasing taxes on the undesirable economic good, fossil 
fuels in this case (Lawrence 2007). The APP scores only well on the push 
side of the issue, whereas the pull issue is markedly absent. As the agree-
ment is voluntary in nature, there is no real incentive for countries to 
adopt costly technologies, especially if they are aware of the leakage is-
sue. Public information might not be able to reach all relevant companies 
that might actually have an incentive to adopt a technology. However, 
higher prices eventually reach all those companies.  
What about the financial base of the APP? The US has promised US$ 50 
million for its first year of operation (Lawrence 2007). Australia has 
promised US$ 150 million over the next 5 years (Lawrence 2007). Com-
pared to the actual need for investment of US$ 10-100 billion annually 
this sum seems meager (Skjaerseth 2009). Even more so when consider-
ing that the members of the APP are responsible for more than 50% of 
global emissions. In the Montreal protocol developed countries had an 
obligation via a certain formula to pay for the incremental cost of devel-
oping countries for acceding to the agreement. In the case of the APP this 
is voluntary and the outcome seems to be disappointing. 
                                                     
5
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4.3 Conclusion 
Members to the APP agree that ‘The Partnership will be consistent with 
and contribute to Partners’ efforts under the UNFCCC and will comple-
ment, but not replace, the Kyoto Protocol’.6 Most of the member coun-
tries that are also bound by the Kyoto protocol are currently failing their 
emission reduction obligations7. Furthermore, the economics of APP sug-
gest that its complementarity with the Kyoto protocol is ambiguous at 
best.  
To date the APP has largely relied on public finance measures. It has the 
potential to bring the private sector into the picture as it has adopted a 
sectoral approach that specifically wants to spread best-practice examples 
from the different sectors. But so far it has achieved little in this respect 
which could have been a major positive distinction in comparison to the 
Kyoto Protocol (Lawrence 2007). The voluntary nature of funding has 
not led to levels of funding that are in line with what is needed, as could 
be expected. But most importantly, the APP neglects the power of the 
‘pull’ incentive. This could come from a system of binding emission lim-
its and trading and is likely to be far more effective than the policy of 
picking winners as it seems to be practiced at the moment. There is room 
for public spending in the field of environmental R&D, but this is gener-
ally more effective at the basic research level and not when bringing 
products to the market.  
The APP can certainly help to bring information about new technologies 
to the market, which is an important part in any technological diffusion 
policy. But as long as APP members are not willing to act upon the negli-
gence described, the partnership cannot be regarded as viable option for 
combating human-induced climate change and is unlikely to be an effec-
tive complement to the Kyoto protocol. Taking into account some of the 
failures described in the last two chapters concerning technology transfer 
as well as the theoretical background in chapter one, a largely self-
conceived technology transfer mechanism will now be introduced in the 
next chapter.  
5 Green Technology Banks 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding section showed that the currently two most important 
international agreements trying to address the issue of human induced 
climate change lack several relevant dimensions in order to be effective. 
The Kyoto Protocol, while limiting emissions in industrialized countries, 
fails to take into account the problem of insufficient R&D in green 
technology and addresses technology transfer only superficially. Further-
more, developing countries do presently not face emission limits, which 
led to an increase of the compliance cost for developed countries as they 
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could not take advantage of the lower abatement cost in developing coun-
tries via emission permit trade. Without developing country participation 
in a climate change agreement, developed countries had an incentive not 
to agree on substantial emission cuts then, due to the associated costs. 
An important actor concerning the provision and dispersion of green 
technology is the private sector. On a global scale they have little in-
centive to increase their efforts in environmental R&D and to take into 
account the effect that this could have in developing countries. Also, 
without the willingness of developing countries to accept binding emis-
sion limits the efforts of developed countries are unlikely to have a signi-
ficant effect due to the issue of leakage.  
The APP is a purely technology-orientated partnership based on volun-
tary participation and contributions. In its founding statement the claim is 
made that it complements the Kyoto Protocol. As argued above, it is 
unlikely to do so. First of all, it is likely to lead to increases in emissions 
due to the working of resource markets. Secondly, its funding so far is 
meager as can be expected from a voluntary agreement that tries to ad-
dress a problem riddled with externality issues. Thirdly, without a techno-
logical ‘pull’ incentive for India and China, by for example binding 
emissions limits, adoption of green technology will be limited.  
A conceivable first-best solution to the problem of the sub-optimal provi-
sion of R&D could be to stipulate commitments in a new climate change 
agreement. Monitoring R&D expenditures of other countries and devel-
oping global guidelines to do so involve substantial transaction costs. 
Hoel (2005) notes ‘Policies aimed at influencing R&D investments by 
private firms will be an integrated part of a country’s tax system and to 
some extent other domestic policies. As tax systems and other policies 
vary significantly across countries, it will in practice hardly be feasible 
for a country (or some international agency) to verify all aspects of R&D 
policies of other countries’ (p.53).    
5.2 GTB 
5.2.1 The Basic Idea 
In order to address some of the previously mentioned shortcomings I will 
now introduce the concept Green Technology Banks (GTB). It is based 
on the idea advanced by Barrett (2001) and Benedick (2001;2007) that a 
more technology-centred approach is necessary to address the issue of 
human induced climate change. The operational details are however quite 
different. The overriding goal of the proposal is to develop an incentive 
compatible mechanism to transfer green technology to developing coun-
tries. This transfer, intended as a side-payment in a new agreement, might 
be one aspect that can help to increase cooperation in a new climate 
change agreement that includes emission limits for all countries. To anal-
yse its potential to do so, game theoretical tools will be used in chapter 
six. As this proposal is largely self-conceived, the proposal should be 
seen as a first step that will not be able to address all concerns in the 
pages ahead. The goal of this section is then to offer an introduction to 
the economic mechanisms that should induce developed and developing 
countries to participate.  
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5.2.2 Assumptions 
Several assumptions are vital for the GTB to be workable. First of all, the 
assumption is made that technology is a private good that has a range of 
positive externalities as discussed in the theory and background chapter. 
Technology here is first and foremost considered to be a technical appar-
atus. The soft-skills that come with it, such as better technical knowledge, 
fall under the category of externalities. Secondly, it is assumed that in the 
foreseeable future there will be no global permit market but rather several 
regional permit markets that are imperfectly linked. Furthermore, these 
regional permit markets will not be perfect in the sense that not all sectors 
of the economy will be regulated by emission caps or taxes, especially in 
developing countries. One implication of this is different abatement cost 
levels in different regions of the world. Finally, as the GTB is to operate 
under a climate change agreement that imposes emission limits on devel-
oped as well as developing countries, any permit transfers that takes place 
will be a zero sum game in terms of global total emissions. If a transfer 
takes place, one country will have to give up emission permits in order 
for the transacting partner to acquire them.  
5.2.3 Informational basis and governance 
Three major obstacles hinder the spreading of already existing green 
technology and environmental R&D at sufficient levels taking into ac-
count its global effects. First of all, it is largely produced by private 
companies in developed countries and it is protected by patents that make 
it often unaffordable for governments and entrepreneurs in developing 
countries. Secondly, developed for condition prevalent in developed 
countries, it cannot easily be used in developing countries. In addition to 
this developing countries often do not have the capacity to adapt the tech-
nology to local circumstances. Finally, there is no common and easily 
accessible database or information source that gives a concise overview 
about the developments in the field of green technology and environ-
mental R&D: ‘Technology infrastructure such as data collection and 
dissemination, and training of scientists and engineers is likely to be seri-
ously underprovided by market incentives alone’. (Jaffe et al. 2005, p. 
173). This lack of information combined with the two previous hind-
rances results in a less than optimal adoption of green technology with 
respect to better known polluting technologies.  
Under the GTB, developed countries are to establish a database with in-
formation about green-technologies available from the public and the 
private sector in developed and developing countries. Information about 
the availability of green technology would become accessible essentially 
for free but the actual construction plans would still be protected by 
patents. The database would be a sales catalogue and users would still 
have to pay for acquiring the actual technology. The goal of the database 
is to create a common platform that is widely known and accepted in 
order to provide up-to-date technological information in the field of green 
technologies to reduce the search costs for the private and public sector in 
both developed and developing countries. Developed countries should 
bear the financial responsibility for setting up the operation. Public and 
private research institutes as well as firms and governments from both 
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developing and developed countries can contribute to the database. As 
argued above, most of the green technology is developed in the private 
sector of rich democratic countries. Most of the input to the database will 
come from there but it can be expected that technology from developing 
countries will play an increasingly important role over time.  
As this will be an international body both developed and developing 
countries should be part of the governance structure with influence not 
attached to financial commitments but rather as equals. Experts from 
developing and developed countries should be responsible for keeping the 
database up to date and approaching both the public and the private sector 
for contributions. Developing country expertise will be crucial to identify 
technology that has the potential to be successfully transferred to 
developing countries or that has the potential to be adopted to local con-
ditions (MacDonald 1992).  
5.2.4 The incentive mechanism to focus more on green technology R&D 
Under the GTB, developed country firms would receive extra emission 
permits if a transfer of technology takes place. How many emission cred-
its are transferred depends on the evaluation of the amount of emissions 
that have been avoided compared to the Business-As-Usual case (BAU). 
An exact determination of how many emissions were avoided could be 
carried out by similar institutions as the ones that are currently responsi-
ble for this task under the CDM. The emission permits could be sold in 
the regional market where the developed country company operates or be 
used to lower the required abatement effort. The opportunity to sell emis-
sion credits in the regional permit market is crucial as it allows developed 
country companies that are not regulated by emission caps to gain from 
increasing R&D into green technology. Both types of companies receive 
then effectively a subsidy for technology transfer. The overall goal of this 
in-kind reward is to increase R&D in green technology that is also appli-
cable in developing countries.  
The developed country government would buy emission credits from the 
government of the company that receives the technology. The former 
then transfers these emission credits to the developed country company 
involved in the project. The developing country government either buys 
the emission rights from the participating company if it is subject to emis-
sion caps, or buys them in the regional emission market if a company is 
not subject to emission caps. Companies in developing countries subject 
to tradable emission caps do not receive a direct subsidy but can now 
obtain technology at a lower price than before. This is due to the standard 
tax/subsidy incidence as shown in Figure 5.1 (see next page), adopted 
from Schotter (2001). 
The initial market price, P0, is defined by the intersection of the curves 
labelled D and S1 .The subsidy to the developed country firm shifts the 
supply curve of technology down to the right. This increases the quantity 
of technology supplied, from Q1 to Q2, and decreases the price consumers 
of technology have to pay, in this case developing country firms. As in 
the standard analysis, how much of the subsidy accrues to consumers and 
how much to suppliers depends on the elasticity of the two curves. In the 
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figure above, the area from Ct to P0 below the demand curve accrues to 
the consumer, developing country firms. The area P0-Pt above the supply 
curve S2 accrues to developed country firms supplying the technology. 
Due to the permit transfer the price of permits in the regional market in 
developing countries will increase, since supply is reduced. However, the 
assumption is made here that the level of the price increase will not be 
substantial enough to offset the benefit of a decreased price of green 
technology. 
Figure 5.1 Effect of a subsidy for developed country firms on the 
price and quantity of green technology 
      
Source: Schotter 2001 
Companies in developing countries that are not subject to emission caps 
receive an actual subsidy besides the decrease in the price of technology. 
The money paid by the developed country government for the emission 
credits obtained by the developing country government will be transfer-
red to them. Since non-regulated companies do not have the same ‘pull’ 
incentive (Lawrence 2007) to adopt green technology as their regulated 
peers, an additional incentive to do so is important.  
Under this transfer scheme the global amount of emissions does not 
change. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 (on next page) illustrate the working of the 
mechanism for companies that are regulated by emission caps and 
companies that are not regulated by emission caps. 
The assumption is made here that if regional permit markets were estab-
lished in developing countries, the market price of permits would be sub-
stantially lower than in a developed country market.. This is based on the 
assessment of various studies that abatement costs are lower in develop-
ing countries (Ellerman et al. 1998; Nordhaus and Boyer 1998; Barrett 
2007). The technology-transfer mechanism would then lead to more 
equal marginal abatement costs in the two regions.  
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Figure 5.2 Technology Transfer among companies subject to 
emission caps 
Source: Self-conceived 
Figure 5.3 Technology Transfer among companies not subject to 
emission caps 
Source: Self-conceived 
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The eligibility of firms in developing countries to receive a technology-
transfer subsidy should be based on the chances of success for advanced 
technology in that country. Such success criteria could for example be 
based on the level of corruption, higher education, rule of law and similar 
institutional indicators as argued above 
Finally, a regular evaluation should take place if the emission credit 
transfer alone is enough to induce sufficient R&D in green technology. If 
this is not the case, then the developed country government should 
evaluate to provide subsidies in addition to emission credits. 
The layout of the GTB and the incentives to develop more green tech-
nology is in some respects similar to a proposal for a technology oriented 
CDM (tCDM) by Teng et al. (2008). Their tCDM will only grant a 
transfer of emission rights, if the transfer of technology is in line with 
goals of the developing country government, such as ‘installation of 
transferred technology, or a cost reduction goal, or a local content goal’. 
(Teng et al. 2008, p.11). To fulfil the additionality criterion, a list of tech-
nologies would be created that are not available in the host country, 
similar to the GTB database. Projects using technology available in the 
developing country would not be eligible for such a credit transfer. Also, 
the government of the developing country can receive part of the credits 
if it provided a facilitating environment for the transfer to take place. The 
most crucial difference between the tCDM and the GTB is the underlying 
assumption that developing countries do not face emission ceilings under 
the tCDM. Both mechanisms can then be regarded as options for different 
scenarios based on the outcome of future climate change negotiations.  
5.2.5 Access to the database and incentives for developing country actors 
The information provided in the database can be accessed by firms, re-
search institutions and governments from both developed and developing 
countries for free. These actors can use the information to identify 
technologies that are suitable for projects they are about to undertake. If 
entrepreneurs of developing countries who are members to a new climate 
change agreement have identified a technology that they would like to 
use, they and the providing company from the developed country engage 
in the transfer described in the previous section. Mostly developed coun-
tries will be responsible for financing the transfer mechanism based on 
the pattern of green technology development discussed in chapter two.  
The transfer scheme does not extend to technology outside the GTB data-
base. Green technologies under the GTB are evaluated by experts for 
their potential effectiveness and stand for a certain quality which cannot 
be assured for technologies outside the agreement. Actors in non-
participating countries to the new climate change agreement will still 
have access to the database, but will not receive subsidies for technolo-
gies acquired via the GTB. Entrepreneurs in developing countries should 
therefore have an interest in pressuring their respective government to 
join the agreement in order to gain access to green technology via GTB, 
as it reduces their cost of operation and offers them technology that might 
otherwise be hard to come by. An important consideration in this context 
pertains to secondary benefits derived from technology transfer. Some of 
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them, such as higher economic growth and more reliable energy infra-
structure, were laid out in chapter two. Additional benefits are usually the 
reduction of other pollutants with a local impact (Ekin 1996), better 
health (Künzli 2001), and increased technical skill of employees. These 
secondary benefits represent then an additional incentive for developing 
countries and firms to participate in the GTB. The relative costliness of 
abstention for developing countries in terms of potential access to sub-
sidized green technology should increase the more developed countries 
are part to a new treaty as the likelihood increases that developing coun-
try actors could find a feasible technology for their projects without hav-
ing to incur higher costs. 
5.2.6 Incentives for developed country actors to join and provide R&D 
In order to increase the involvement of the private sector in developed 
countries in green technology R&D and dispersion private firms receive 
subsidies in form of emission credits from their governments for technol-
ogy transferred under the GTB. These can then be sold on the regional 
permit market or used to reduce obligatory abatement effort. This repre-
sents a ‘push’ and ‘pull’ incentive (Jaffe et al. 2005) for private firms and 
research institutions in developed countries to take into account the effect 
that their technology can have in developing countries. Firms from devel-
oped countries can comply with emission limits imposed on them at a 
lower cost. The abatement that they undertake in developing countries via 
their technology transfer is likely to be cheaper than it would have been at 
home. If they are not subject to emission caps, they can sell the emission 
permits in the marketplace. An extensive analysis if these incentives are 
sufficient is not part of this report but would be a valuable extension if 
data is available.  
The setup of the GTB is similar to the one that drives the CDM and 
transactions occurring under this mechanism are rapidly increasing. But 
any mechanism that has the goal of transferring technology from devel-
oped and developing countries and aims to be incentive compatible will 
run into these costs Once again, a definitive analysis of the transaction 
costs of the CDM and GTB mechanism are not part of this report but 
would be valuable extensions.  
An additional incentive is dependent on the level of usage and popularity 
of the GTB. The more known the GTB is in developing countries, the 
more beneficial will participating in it be as developing and developed 
country entrepreneurs will use it as a standard tool to find technologies 
that are necessary for their projects. This has the potential to reduce mar-
keting costs for developed country firms.  
5.2.7 Technical assistance 
In addition to financial assistance, technical assistance will be needed as 
well in order to train personnel to maintain the technology and to further 
its distribution in the economy from a local basis. This can be part of the 
GTB transfer if the company providing the technology also has experts 
available that can help to implement technology locally. Otherwise, auc-
tions should be held to find the best offer for technical assistance. Many 
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development agencies around the world have technical departments that 
would be well equipped to cater to this need.  
5.2.8 Green technology and Non-Members to a new climate change 
agreement 
Should countries part to a new climate change agreement actively hamper 
the access to green technology to non-participants? One way in which 
developed countries benefit from the deployment of green-technologies 
in developing countries is the reduction of abatement effort at home. 
Clarke et al. (2008), by employing the MiniCAM integrated assessment 
model, show that the cost of compliance for the US when technology is 
also available in developing countries is considerably lower compared to 
the scenario where the technology is only available in the US. Besides 
attaining a leading position in a field of technology that has promising 
prospects, this re-enforcing argument should be factored in the decision 
on the level of investment into green technology and how to deal with 
non-participants to the GTB. Trying to block usage of green technology 
by countries not part to a new climate change agreement is potentially 
harmful to them. Golombek and Hoel (2005) investigate a situation where 
there is a ‘clean’ country that is concerned with the environment and per-
forms R&D and a ‘dirty’ country that is little concerned with the environ-
ment and performs no R&D. There is no agreement concerning limiting 
emissions between the two actors. Technological spillovers occur in a 
linear fashion. It is shown that if abatement is increased in the clean 
country via more R&D that lowers abatement costs, technological spill-
overs lead to more abatement in the dirty country as well if the damage 
function is linear, otherwise the effect is not clear. One could argue that it 
is important to have a threat in place in order to encourage countries to 
join a new climate change agreement. But since it would be beneficial for 
the developer of a technology to allow for spillovers to take place freely 
given that technology is already developed, it is unlikely that this will be 
a useful tool.  
5.2.9 GTB in comparison to CDM 
The GTB mechanism is in some respects similar to the CDM mechanism 
in place now. It offers governments or firms from developed countries an 
opportunity to achieve abatement at a lower cost in developing countries. 
Emission reductions must be certified which implies similar transactions 
cost issues as for the CDM. Yet any mechanism that wants to promote 
transfers of this kind will be subject to these issues.  
As mentioned before, a definite comparison of transaction costs between 
CDM and GTB is not part of this report. However, compared to CDM the 
GTB offers a different incentive structure to resolve the disparity of 
worldwide green technology distribution. First of all, it establishes an in-
formational base that was previously not available. Secondly, where tech-
nology transfer came more as a by-product in the CDM case, it is the 
overriding goal in the GTB case. Finally, developed countries subsidize 
green technology transfer to developing country companies by buying 
emission permits from their respective government which then transfers 
the money back to them. The CDM mechanism does not have a similar 
provision (Seres 2007).  
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5.3 Summary 
The GTB is a side-payment mechanism that has the goal to increase co-
operation in a new climate change agreement that entails emission limits 
for both developed and developing countries. The assumption of an en-
compassing climate change agreement is a substantial but necessary one 
for the GTB to work. Otherwise, the working of resource markets de-
scribed above would probably lead to more emissions globally. More 
importantly, the emission credit transfer mechanism developed above 
would not work. Another crucial assumption is the non-existence of a 
global permit market. Furthermore, within the regional permit markets 
not all sectors are regulated by emission caps.  
The GTB is designed to offer benefits to both developed and developing 
countries while raising the cost of non-participation in a new climate 
change agreement. First and foremost it addresses the problem of in-
formation flow between the developed and developing world on the issue 
of green-technologies. Too little information about what technology is 
available in the developed world and too little interest in adopting this 
technology to circumstances in the developing world are present today. 
The private sector plays an important role in this context, but global 
mechanisms reflect this only to a minor degree. To rectify this, firms in 
developed countries are offered several incentives. They receive extra 
emission permits depending on how many emissions have been avoided 
in a developing country due to their technology. These permits can then 
be sold in the regional market or be used to reduce their obligatory 
abatement effort. This should be an incentive for both regulated and un-
regulated companies to participate. If this incentive turns out to be in-
sufficient to induce environmental R&D at a high enough level, devel-
oped country governments should consider direct subsidies in addition to 
the transfer of emission permits.  
Firms in developing countries have an interest in pressuring their govern-
ments to gain access to the GTB, as they profit from lower market prices 
from technology and potential secondary benefits from technology trans-
fer, if they are regulated by emission caps. Unregulated companies re-
ceive a direct monetary subsidy in addition to a lower price for technolo-
gy. This subsidy is equivalent to the amount of emissions avoided 
compared to the BAU-case times the price of permits in the regional 
market. The underlying reason for the extra subsidy for unregulated 
companies is that they do not have a similar ‘pull’ incentive to adopt 
cleaner technology as regulated companies. Developed country govern-
ments would shoulder most of the financial burden of the GTB since 
companies from developed countries are by and large responsible for the 
R&D of green-technologies.  
In conclusion, by establishing GTB developed country governments can 
potentially increase the likelihood of developing country participation in 
global abatement efforts, which is a pre-requisite for avoiding drastic cli-
mate change based on current emission projections. In order to assess the 
viability of the GTB to do so, the next section will employ non-
cooperative game theory to see if it can strengthen the self-enforcing 
nature that a global climate change agreement must have.  
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6 The GTB Game 
6.1 The Asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
To analyze whether the GTB idea has the potential to increase coopera-
tion in a post-Kyoto climate change agreement this section will draw on 
results from non-cooperative game theory. The choice to use non-
cooperative theory is based on the discussion in section 2.2 about self-
enforcing agreements. Countries are unlikely to reach an agreement in a 
cooperative setting as long as it is not in their self-interest, considering 
the actions of other participants out of their control. They will then only 
adhere to agreements if they derive a positive payoff from doing so, while 
taking the actions of others as given. The analysis will start out by setting 
the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) situation into the context of climate change 
negotiations. It will then proceed by including the technology transfer 
scheme described above as a strategy in order to see if this can help to 
reach and sustain the cooperative outcome. A further adjustment will be 
the introduction of asymmetries between the two players.  
6.1.1 Players and bargaining 
There are two players, a coalition of developed countries C and a coali-
tion of developing countries A. This is a simplification as compared to 
the situation in chapter five were at least four parties were involved, an 
aggregate of firms and the government in developed and developing 
countries. Coalition members will adhere to the policy decided upon for 
the whole coalition. Internal bargaining problems due to an uneven dis-
tribution of benefits which might require compensatory transfers are 
assumed away. 
6.1.2 The payoff function and the business as usual case 
The payoff function presented in this section adopted from Wagner 
(2001) will be modeled in terms of abatement only. This is assumed to be 
the only action variable for both players. All strategies lead to different 
levels of abatement. The payoff function for player C is then defined as 
follows:  
)()(),( CCACC qcqBqq −=Π   (1) 
q=qA+qC, stands for abatement effort and subscripts C and A for the a-
batement effort of the respective player. )(qB is the benefit function for 
each individual player with the following properties:  
0)(,0)( 22 <∂+∂>∂+∂ ijiiijii qqqBqqqB  ACi ,= .   
The benefit function is concave and increasing in abatement of any of the 
two players. The benefit of abatement is the avoidance of damages that 
would occur otherwise. )( Cqc is the cost function of abatement with the 
following properties:   
22 )(,0)( CCCC qqcqqc ∂∂>∂∂   
In other words, the cost function is increasing and convex in own abate-
ment effort. Both functions start at the origin, 0)0(,0)0( == cB . 
Maximizing (1) with respect to the variable that the players control, their 
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own abatement effort, yields the individual country’s’ optimality condi-
tion:  
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Marginal benefits of abatement for each country should equal marginal 
cost of abatement for each country in absence of any agreement 
specifying abatement levels, provided the other coalition’s strategy is 
considered fixed. This case will be referred to as the business-as-usual 
case, representing the fully non-cooperative case in the PD-game below 
since both coalitions optimize their abatement only according to their 
own benefit. 
6.1.3 Asymmetries 
The two players in the PD-game are assumed to be asymmetric. Two 
factors define the asymmetry in this game. First of all, given a total level 
of abatement q=qA+qC, BA(q) will always be higher than BC(q) .This 
asymmetry is introduced since the most recent reports on the impact of 
human induced climate change indicate that developing countries will 
suffer most from climate change and especially so since they have less 
financial means to adapt (Stern 2007; IPCC 2008a). Secondly, the level 
of abatement to be undertaken if one of the players or both cooperate is 
unequal. Player C, if cooperating, will be obliged to abate considerably 
more than player A. This assumption is based on the notion that devel-
oped countries are responsible for most of the emissions in the atmo-
sphere today and therefore should carry most of the burden to achieve 
world-wide abatement. If a player decides to cooperate his abatement 
choice becomes discrete, as he will be bound by treaty obligations. If he 
chooses not to cooperate his decision will still be based on equations (3) 
and (4) 
6.1.4 Strategy space and the game in normal form 
The strategy space for player C is },{ NCCPSC = and the strategy space 
for player A is },{ NCCPS A = . If the cooperative strategy CP is played, 
a player has to abate an exogenously given amount which is assumed to 
be larger as compared to what each player would have abated without an 
agreement. Specifying abatement obligations in this fashion allows for 
the usage of the continuous benefit function to analyze the payoff from 
strategies, even if they represent discrete choices since the interest lies in 
the overall payoff which is defined by equation (2). Under strategy NC, 
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both players choose their abatement levels according to equations (3) and 
(4). Situations where one player cooperates while the other defect can be 
considered as a situation with partial climate change agreements where 
only one region abates. The full cooperative situation {CP,CP} is equiva-
lent to a global climate change agreement being in place where both 
developed and developing countries decrease their emissions. The game 
then looks as follows:  
Figure 6.1 The PD-Game 
 A  
C CP NC 
CP 4,7 -3,8 
NC 6,-1 0,0 
6.1.5 Payoff analysis and the Nash-equilibrium 
Payoffs on the left accrue to player C, payoffs on the right to player A. 
Payoffs here are modeled to be consistent with the assumptions made 
above. The result would not change with different numbers, as long as the 
relative difference between them is maintained. The Nash-Equilibrium in 
the one-shot situation considered here is {NC,NC} as in the standard PD-
game since both players have an incentive to deviate from the cooperative 
outcome as they can gain as long as the other player continues to cooper-
ate. Knowing this, rational players will choose not to abate as they cannot 
rely on the cooperation of the other. The payoff in this situation for both 
players is {0,0}. Payoffs for both players are zero as this case represents 
the BAU-scenario and no benefits or losses accrue to the players beyond 
what they would have done when strictly maximizing their own benefit. 
Due to the asymmetries the payoffs differ from the standard symmetric 
PD-situation. The following cell by cell analysis should give an overview 
of how they affect the payoffs.  
{NC,NC} to {NC,CP} 
Player A has now specific abatement obligations, which are assumed to 
be higher than what he would have abated without an agreement. This 
implies an increase in cost, but also increased benefits. Overall however, 
the increase in cost should outweigh the increase in benefits as he has to 
deviate from his non-cooperative optimal choice and no abatement from 
C takes place. Benefits for C increase as he profits from A’s abatement 
while he does not have to incur extra cost.  
{NC,NC} to {CP,NC} 
Costs for C are substantially higher due to the obligatory abatement 
which is large relative to A’s obligations. Benefits for C increase as well, 
but he has to deviate from the optimality condition which leads to an 
overall negative outcome. Benefits for player A increase likewise consid-
erably due to player C’s abatement while he bears no extra costs since he 
does not cooperate. 
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{NC,NC} to {CP,CP} 
Benefits increase for both players due to the abatement that takes place, 
relatively more for player A due to the asymmetry of the benefit func-
tions. Costs increase for both players as well since both have to carry-out 
obligatory abatement above what they would do in the absence of an 
international agreement. For player C the costs increase relatively more 
since he has more abatement to carry out. Therefore, C’s overall benefit 
is less than that of player A. 
The outcome in real world terms is that no global or partial climate 
change agreement is in place that would lead to abatement. As the strate-
gy space available is similar to the one that was up for negotiation when 
the Kyoto Protocol was agreed upon, the outcome of the negotiations 
may seem similar to the situation where player C cooperates and A de-
fects. Why would developed countries still cooperate? As described 
above some developed countries did in fact not join the protocol, most 
prominently the US. In many cases it is uncertain if abatement obliga-
tions under the protocol will be fulfilled. The tendency of countries since 
the Protocol has been active seems to have been a move towards the non-
cooperative Nash-Equilibrium. It seems therefore likely that the Kyoto 
Protocol did not provide sufficient incentives to sustain cooperation a-
mong developed players or offer sufficient incentives for developing 
countries to join. In the following section a game with the GTB offering 
new strategic choices will be considered to find out if this mechanism 
could provide incentives to sustain a cooperative outcome.  
6.2 The GTB Game  
6.2.1 Cost/Benefit functions and the GTB 
The benefit function and the conditions that apply to it are still the same 
as in the PD-game, but changes occur to the cost function once the GTB 
is introduced. A general benefit that is assumed to accrue to both players 
when the GTB mechanism is setup is lower marginal abatement costs. 
The GTB encourages environmental R&D and the simplifying assump-
tion is made here that more R&D leads to lower abatement costs thus:  
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where C/GTB and A/GTB stand for the marginal cost for developed and 
developing countries respectively with GTB. Player C gains additionally 
if the GTB is set up since he obtains emission permits from player A for 
transferring technology which means that he has to carry out less abate-
ment. Abatement cost for player A increase since the overall allocation of 
permits does not change and a reduction in his emission permits leads to 
more abatement obligations and higher cost. Transactions costs that 
would most certainly occur under any such emission permit transfer 
mechanism are assumed away here. However, as player C has to abate 
substantially more than player A when cooperating, a decrease in cost is 
an important channel through which his willingness to cooperate can be 
furthered.  
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6.2.2 Players and strategy space 
The players taking part in the GTB game are the same as before, a 
coalition of developed countries C and a coalition of developing countries 
A. The strategy space for player C is },,{ CPNCTSCPSC −=  and 
},{ NCCPS A = for A. CP-TS for player C implies that he faces obliga-
tory abatement requirements as in the CP case described above and that 
the GTB mechanism will be setup by player C. CP-TS is only a strategic 
option for player C as the assumption is made that green technology is 
pre-dominantly researched and developed in the countries that are as-
sumed to be part to such a collation, Germany, US, Japan and France for 
example. CP for both C and A implies that both have to carry out obliga-
tory abatement but no GTB mechanism is setup. NC implies that both 
players will abate according to (3) and (4). The payoffs for the strategy 
combinations from the PD-game are unchanged. The normal form of the 
game then looks as follows 
Figure 6.2 The GTB-Game 
 A  
C CP NC 
CP-TS C11,A11 C21,A21 
CP 4,7 -2,8 
NC 6,1 0,0 
6.2.3 Payoffs, GTB and Nash-Equilibrium 
The goal of the following analysis is to find out what payoffs in cells 
{CP-TS,CP} and {CP-TS,NC} would have to be to constitute a Nash-
Equilibrium. For {CP-TS,CP} to be a Nash-equilibrium, deviation has to 
yield a lower payoff for both players than cooperation. This implies that 
C11>6, the payoff from cooperation for player C including GTB has to 
be higher than the payoff from playing NC while A continues to cooper-
ate. Furthermore, A11>A21, the payoff for player A has to be higher than 
the payoff from defecting while C continues to cooperate.  
Does the GTB offer sufficient incentives to fulfill these conditions? The 
following discussion is kept at an informal level. A definitive conclusion 
can only be reached with further specification of the cost and benefit 
functions. The results obtained below should serve as an indication for 
the reader where the most crucial frictions are.  
The GTB reduces compliance cost for player C as his marginal abatement 
costs are lowered due to more environmental R&D. In addition he re-
ceives some of A’s emission permits for the technology transfer. There-
fore, he has to carry out less abatement and his costs are lowered. Com-
pared to {CP,CP} player C should then have a higher payoff as his costs 
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are reduced while benefits stay at the same level since global abatement 
does not change under the GTB. If the reduction in cost is sufficiently 
large, the GTB has the potential to make CP-TS the dominant strategy for 
player C when A plays CP.  
Concerning player A, a first step is to analyze how his payoff changes 
when moving from {CP,CP} to {CP-TS, CP}. Compliance costs are 
lowered as player A profits from more environmental R&D. However, 
costs also increase as player A transfers emission permits to player C 
which increase compliance cost. Whether his payoff increases overall is 
therefore ambiguous. What about {CP,NC} in comparison to {CP-
TS,NC}? {CP-TS,NC} should have the exact same payoffs for A as 
{CP,NC} since the GTB cannot work without obligatory abatement effort 
for player A. Thus A21=8.  
In summary, the discussion for player A seems to indicate that NC is the 
dominant strategy when C plays CP-TS. Since the payoff to player C 
when A does not cooperate is equal with or without the GTB, -2 in the 
matrix above, his dominant strategy if A plays NC is NC. The Nash-
equilibrium would then be {NC,NC}. 
6.2.4 Secondary benefits 
The main market failure that the GTB tries to address is the lack of envi-
ronmental R&D worldwide. More R&D, and the following transfer from 
developed to developing countries, will most likely not only replace 
brown technology; it will also lead to some potentially substantial sec-
ondary benefits. As mentioned in chapter one and five, these can include 
higher economic growth, a more reliable energy infrastructure, the reduc-
tion of other pollutants with a local impact, better health and the in-
creased technical skills of employees. These potential benefits are not 
part of the simple payoff function above since they do not easily translate 
into abatement. If they would be modelled, the payoff to player A is 
likely to increase which might establish the fully cooperative solution as a 
new Nash-Equilibrium {CP-TS,CP}. But a caveat is in order here since 
this result depends crucially on the exact modelling of the secondary 
benefits, which is not done here.  
6.3 Conclusion 
The results obtained in this section are tentative and should be confirmed 
with a formal analysis which was not feasible given the time limits of this 
report. However, an important result is that with the asymmetries as-
sumed here, a difference in benefits of abatement and a difference in 
abatement obligations, the GTB mechanism as introduced in this game is 
not likely to help establish a Nash-equilibrium in a game of international 
cooperation on a new climate change agreement. The GTB lowers the 
cost of compliance for the developed country coalition while the result 
for the developing country coalition is ambiguous. Important factors left 
out in the previous analysis are secondary benefits. Their potential posi-
tive impact could lead to the establishment of the fully cooperative out-
come as a new Nash-equilibrium. Further issues that should be consid-
ered in a more elaborate model, indicating the need for further research, 
will now be addressed in the concluding section. 
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7 Summary 
This report has investigated if a technology transfer mechanism, different 
from currently operating ones, could help to increase cooperation under a 
new climate change agreement. A new agreement should be as globally 
encompassing as possible to avoid emission leakage via the working of 
resource markets and would therefore include emission limits for both 
developed and developing countries. The motivation for evaluating the 
issue from this perspective stems from the insight that the problem of 
human induced climate change faces two separate market failures: A 
largely unincorporated externality from greenhouse gases on the one hand 
and a lack of environmental R&D due to inconsideration of its global 
effects on the other hand. A priori, a technology transfer scheme under a 
global climate change agreement seems to have the potential to address 
both problems.  
The analysis started out by evaluating current mechanisms to transfer 
technology, operating under the Kyoto Protocol and the APP. A result 
that emerged in the case of the Kyoto Protocol was that its mechanisms 
address technology transfer between developed and developing countries 
in a rather indirect fashion. Additionally, they do not fulfill optimality 
conditions when considering the two market failures mentioned above. 
The CDM suffers from bad incentives that lead to too high avoided 
emission claims from participating parties. Permit trading might lead to 
more R&D but probably not at a sufficient level and more importantly it 
does not address the issue of technology transfer. Since the Kyoto 
Protocol does not encompass all countries and furthermore does not cover 
all sectors in Annex I countries, emission reductions in one sector may 
lead to an increase in emissions elsewhere in the economy. The time-
frame of the Protocol is most likely too short to induce long-term invest-
ment needed for some essential green-technologies to reach a marketable 
status. Emission cuts for Annex I countries are also far from sufficient to 
avoid a high probability of drastic climate change, which has been at-
tributed to the consensus-treaty nature of the agreement. However, one 
should not forget that the Kyoto Protocol represents the first serious effort 
to address the issue of human induced climate change and that it was 
clear from the outset that the result would not be perfect. It is never-
theless crucial to realize these short-comings when designing a new 
agreement.  
By employing recent results from resource economic theory concerning 
the influence of the price of green-technologies on the extraction path of 
non-renewable resource relevant for the green-house effect, the argument 
was made that the APP does not address the issue of human induced 
climate change effectively. Without binding emission limits for its mem-
bers it may actually worsen the situation and incentives to actually apply 
new green technology are low. This is due to the likely price development 
of non-renewable resources when green-technologies are introduced 
which might actually lead to more greenhouse gas emissions. The sector-
al approach concerning the development and transfer of technologies 
deserves credit and can serve as an input for the development of a more 
effective technology transfer scheme. A vital actor that both the Kyoto 
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Protocol and the APP fail to include through economic incentives at a 
sufficient scale is the private sector. Without including this sector and its 
R&D capacity in an effective manner, it is unlikely that sufficient transfer 
of technology will ever take place.  
To address the short-comings with respect to technology transfer that 
both agreements have, the GTB concept was introduced. The first goal of 
the scheme is to address the lack of information about the availability of 
green-technologies. For the GTB to be workable certain assumptions are 
vital: First of all, the overall amount of emission permits worldwide 
should not change under this arrangement. Secondly, I assume that there 
is a global permit market, but an imperfect one. The GTB offers incen-
tives for both developed and developing country actors to engage in the 
transfer of technology, with technology suitable to conditions in develop-
ing countries. Realizing that the directionality of the transfer runs from 
North to South is crucial. The underlying reason for this pattern of R&D 
concerning green-technologies has been established in chapter two. 
There, the conclusion was reached that environmental R&D takes by and 
large place in rich and democratic countries. Developed country actors 
can gain since they receive emission permits, which can be sold in the 
local permit market or used to reduce abatement obligations. Developing 
country actors not regulated by emission caps receive benefits in mone-
tary form since their governments would buy emission credits according 
to the amount of emissions avoided in the local permit market. These will 
then be bought by the developed country government and the funds 
would be transferred to the developing country entrepreneur. A benefit 
that accrues to both regulated and non-regulated actors in the developing 
country is a decrease in the price of green technology. This follows from 
the working of market mechanisms if a subsidy is paid to developed 
country actors in the form of emission permits. Finally, there are potenti-
ally significant secondary benefits that accrue to the developing country 
actors such as higher economic growth, a more reliable energy infrastruc-
ture, the reduction of other pollutants with a local impact, better health 
and the increased technical skills of employees. Since I discovered no 
prior evaluation of exactly such a proposal during my research, the goal 
of the analysis carried out here was to introduce the reader to the basic 
incentives that underlie the GTB and show were the most important 
frictions lay. Undoubtedly, there are still a variety of issues that need 
further investigation. For example the issue of product piracy, potential 
negative effects of technology, the political feasibility of such a scheme 
and how to integrate such an approach with official development aid ef-
forts. 
Finally, a simple game theoretic analysis was carried out to determine if 
the GTB could potentially increase cooperation in a new climate change 
agreement. In the games analyzed two players participated, a coalition of 
developed countries, player C, and a coalition of developing countries, 
player A. A further assumption was the asymmetry of players. They are 
assumed to derive different benefits from abatement as well as receiving 
differing amounts of emission permits. The latter assumption leads to 
different abatement costs and makes side-payments a viable option from 
which both sides can profit. The analysis started with the asymmetric PD-
situation where payoffs were modeled and based on the assumptions 
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made. As in the standard one-shot PD-game the non-cooperative outcome 
was the Nash-equilibrium. In the following game, the GTB strategy was 
added to the developed country coalition’s strategy space. In order to 
determine if this could help to achieve and sustain a cooperative solution 
between the two players, an informal discussion about the requirements 
of the payoffs in order to make cooperation a dominant strategy was 
presented. For player C the result emerged that a sufficient reduction in 
costs due to the GTB could make cooperation with the GTB mechanism 
in place the dominant strategy. For player A the result was ambiguous 
since costs decrease on the one hand due to more environmental R&D, 
but increase on the other hand due to transfer of emissions permits to 
player C. Since benefits do not change for player A when he moves from 
the non-cooperative strategy without the GTB to the one that includes it, 
the discussion pointed towards dominance of the non-cooperative 
strategy for player A. Given A’s strategic choice, a rational response from 
player C would be to not cooperate, re-establishing the non-cooperative 
outcome as a Nash-Equilibrium as in the PD-game. In conclusion, the 
GTB game as modeled in chapter six was unlikely to help establishing a 
cooperative solution under a new climate change treaty with obligatory 
abatement for developing and developed countries.  
Future research on this issue could address several concerns. First of all, 
the secondary benefits that could potentially accrue to player A when a 
technology transfer takes place are not part of the payoff function. It 
solely depends on abatement effort of the two players. Taking secondary 
effects into account could substantially increase the likelihood of player 
A to cooperate. Secondly, bargaining between firms and governments 
could be introduced before the negotiations between governments take 
place. This would make it a two-level game. Introducing this aspect 
might be more in line what can be expected in actual negotiations since 
companies are likely to do what they can to reduce abatement effort, 
exerting strong lobbying pressure at the national and international level. 
Thirdly, a numerical analysis specifying cost and benefit functions might 
be carried out. In this analysis the number of players should be increased, 
specifying individual countries and their characteristics. This should help 
determine the size of the cooperating coalition. Finally, further asym-
metries could be introduced such as the ability of different developing 
countries to adopt green-technologies, which can have an impact on their 
benefit function 
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